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Professor Emily Sack's Post 
More Death Penalty Puzzles Highlighted by New Supreme 
Court Case 
Posted by Emily Sack on 02/24/2015 at 09:00 AM 
On the evening of January 15, 2015, Oklahoma 
prisoner Charles Warner died by lethal injection, shortly after the Supreme Court denied his application for 
a stay of execution.  Warner had also filed a petition for certiorari, in which he argued that the lethal 
injection protocol used by Oklahoma violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. Eight days after Warner was executed, the Court granted the petition for certiorari in his 
case.   
How could the Court refuse to stay a man’s execution and then, just a few days later, agree to hear the 
merits of his case? The technical answer is that the procedures of the Court permit such a Kafkaesque 
result – it takes a majority of the Court, five Justices, to grant a stay, but only four to grant a petition for 
certiorari.  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan, had vigorously dissented 
from the denial of the stay. Presumably these four dissenters voted to grant the petition and hear the 
merits of the case (which was still pending despite Warner’s death because three other Oklahoma death 
row prisoners remained as petitioners). We cannot know if there were additional votes in favor of hearing 
the case, because the Court does not release votes on the granting of cert. petitions. 
However, there are deeper unresolved questions. Though the four Justices had the power to grant the 
petition on their own, it seems unlikely they would have done so unless they believed there was some 
chance of getting a fifth vote when the Court considered the merits of the case.  Did at least one other 
Justice indicate that he might consider such a case favorably?  If so wouldn’t that Justice have voted to 
grant the stay of Warner’s execution a week earlier? 
The procedural riddles do not end there. The three 
remaining petitioners were scheduled to be executed before April 2015, when the Court is due to hear 
arguments in the case.  Again, despite the grant of certiorari, the Court was not required to grant stays of 
their executions. However, circumstances had now changed – the Court had agreed to hear the merits of 
the case,  and the Oklahoma Attorney General had actually applied for a stay until the case was decided, 
or at least until the state could obtain a “viable alternative” to use of midazolam, the drug at issue in the 
Oklahoma injection protocol.  On January 28, 2015, just a day before the now-lead petitioner, Richard 
Glossip, was scheduled to die, the Court granted the stays. The order was unsigned, and so we do not 
know which Justice(s) joined the four who had dissented from the previous denial, to reach the five 
required.   
The substantive issues raised by the case are no less important than the procedural conundrum it has 
highlighted.  The Court has never found a particular method of execution to be unconstitutional, and in 
2008 in Baze v. Rees, the Court specifically considered and upheld the three drug lethal injection protocol 
used by Kentucky.  However, since Baze, the only U.S. manufacturer of the barbiturate used as part of the 
Kentucky protocol stopped its production. European manufacturers began to refuse to export the drug to 
the U.S. for use in executions, and in 2011 the European Union issued strict export restrictions for a range 
of related drugs used for this purpose.  Unable to obtain this drug, corrections officials in several states 
have turned in recent years to new and untested drugs and drug combinations for their executions, often 
without revealing their source. 
In April 2014, for the execution of Clayton Lockett, Oklahoma experimented with a different drug as part of 
its three drug protocol -- midazolam, a benzodiazepine which is designed to render the inmate 
unconscious, so that he would not feel severe pain from the effects of the subsequent drugs that would kill 
him. The Lockett execution was macabre – he was awake and writhing on the execution table after the 
drugs were injected and began to speak, saying that the drugs weren’t working. Though the execution 
process was terminated, more than 40 minutes after the drugs were administered he finally died. 
Midazolam also was used in what the New York Times called “problematic executions” in other states in 
the past year, where the prisoners appeared to gasp for several minutes before dying. Yet, after review, 
Oklahoma decided to continue use of midazolam in executions, though at a higher dosage and with some 
revised procedures.   
In Glossip v. Gross, the Court will consider whether executions using midazolam are unconstitutional. It 
also likely will revisit the legal standard for determining the constitutionality of a particular method of 
execution, an issue on which the Baze Court was badly splintered. 
In the past several decades, the Court has shown little appetite for considering whether the death penalty 
is unconstitutional per se.  However, in recent years, it has narrowed its use, largely focusing on the types 
of offenses or offenders that may be death penalty eligible.  A decision granting relief to the petitioners in 
Glossip will not invalidate the death penalty.  But given the unavailability of more accepted drugs, it would 
make the death penalty difficult, if not impossible, to implement in practice.  As Justice Sotomayor stated 
in her dissent from the denial of Warner’s stay: “Petitioners have committed horrific crimes, and should be 
punished. But the Eighth Amendment guarantees that no one should be subjected to an execution that 
causes searing, unnecessary pain before death.”  The outcome of Glossip may provide us with more 
clues to this divided Court’s understanding of the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Perhaps the events 
of this case also will lead the Court to reconsider its procedures in death penalty cases, to prevent the 
grisly and unseemly prospect of failing to stay the execution of a man whose case it deems worthy of 
substantive review. 
